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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP1117 |
DP1117 Redistributive Policy in a Transition Economy: The Case of Hungary | |
Stephen Pudney; Sarah Jarvis | |
发表日期 | 1995-01-31 |
出版年 | 1995 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies the optimal regulatory policy in a market where entry may occur. The regulator regulates the incumbent, but not the entrant in the event of entry. We show that the effect of entry on prices and incentives for cost reduction depends on the extent of the regulator's commitment: if it is possible to commit to the chosen policy, then the market outcome following entry is less competitive than it would be without the possibility to commit: price is higher and incentives for cost reduction weaker. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Commitment Entry Regulation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1117 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530257 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen Pudney,Sarah Jarvis. DP1117 Redistributive Policy in a Transition Economy: The Case of Hungary. 1995. |
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