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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP1148 |
DP1148 Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies | |
Jane Rapson; Paul Levine; Joseph Pearlman | |
发表日期 | 1995-03-31 |
出版年 | 1995 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper considers a new approach to the optimal management and analysis of exchange rate target zones by regarding the operation of a target zone as a dynamic signalling game between the monetary authorities and the financial markets. A Sequential Open Loop (Feedback) policy of sterilized intervention is proposed that depends critically on the evolution of the policy-maker's credibility as opposed to the open loop precommitment strategy that has been implemented, for instance, in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS and in the Bretton Woods system. The width of the target zone and realignments are in turn determined optimally given the policy-maker's credibility. A commitment to this form of flexible target zone is shown through simulation to provide substantial stabilization for the exchange rate while retaining considerable flexibility and robustness in response to shocks. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Credibility Dynamic policy Exchange rate target zones Flexibility Incentive compatability sterilized intervention Signalling |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1148 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530290 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jane Rapson,Paul Levine,Joseph Pearlman. DP1148 Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies. 1995. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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