G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1148
DP1148 Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies
Jane Rapson; Paul Levine; Joseph Pearlman
发表日期1995-03-31
出版年1995
语种英语
摘要This paper considers a new approach to the optimal management and analysis of exchange rate target zones by regarding the operation of a target zone as a dynamic signalling game between the monetary authorities and the financial markets. A Sequential Open Loop (Feedback) policy of sterilized intervention is proposed that depends critically on the evolution of the policy-maker's credibility as opposed to the open loop precommitment strategy that has been implemented, for instance, in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS and in the Bretton Woods system. The width of the target zone and realignments are in turn determined optimally given the policy-maker's credibility. A commitment to this form of flexible target zone is shown through simulation to provide substantial stabilization for the exchange rate while retaining considerable flexibility and robustness in response to shocks.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Credibility Dynamic policy Exchange rate target zones Flexibility Incentive compatability sterilized intervention Signalling
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1148
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530290
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jane Rapson,Paul Levine,Joseph Pearlman. DP1148 Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies. 1995.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Jane Rapson]的文章
[Paul Levine]的文章
[Joseph Pearlman]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Jane Rapson]的文章
[Paul Levine]的文章
[Joseph Pearlman]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Jane Rapson]的文章
[Paul Levine]的文章
[Joseph Pearlman]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。