全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP1148 Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP1148
	DP1148 Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies
	Jane Rapson; Paul Levine; Joseph Pearlman
发表日期	1995-03-31
出版年	1995
语种	英语
摘要	This paper considers a new approach to the optimal management and analysis of exchange rate target zones by regarding the operation of a target zone as a dynamic signalling game between the monetary authorities and the financial markets. A Sequential Open Loop (Feedback) policy of sterilized intervention is proposed that depends critically on the evolution of the policy-maker's credibility as opposed to the open loop precommitment strategy that has been implemented, for instance, in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS and in the Bretton Woods system. The width of the target zone and realignments are in turn determined optimally given the policy-maker's credibility. A commitment to this form of flexible target zone is shown through simulation to provide substantial stabilization for the exchange rate while retaining considerable flexibility and robustness in response to shocks.
主题	International Macroeconomics
关键词	Credibility Dynamic policy Exchange rate target zones Flexibility Incentive compatability sterilized intervention Signalling
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp1148
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530290
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jane Rapson,Paul Levine,Joseph Pearlman. DP1148 Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies. 1995.