| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1163 |
| DP1163 Tests of the 'Convergence Hypothesis': Some Further Results | |
| Daniel Cohen | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the open economy aspects of the 'delegation game' in which the operation of monetary policy is delegated to independent and `conservative' central bankers with a greater dislike of inflation than the public. When all countries optimally and independently choose the conservatism of their bankers a highly inefficient Nash equilibrium can result. This inefficiency increases as the number of countries increases, the correlation of shocks increases, and if there is unemployment persistence. Delegation can be counterproductive in the sense that the non-cooperative equilibrium of the delegation game results in a lower welfare than that of the representative bankers game. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Conservative bankers Delegation game monetary policy Open economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1163 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530305 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Cohen. DP1163 Tests of the 'Convergence Hypothesis': Some Further Results. 1995. |
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