| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1204
|
| DP1204 Free Trade and Evolving Standards |
| Alessandra Casella
|
| 发表日期 | 1995-07-31
|
| 出版年 | 1995
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The early 1990s marked a distinction between the EMS as a vehicle for creating monetary stability and the EMS as a vehicle for moving towards monetary union. We model that distinction by contrasting policies generated by preference transfers from the lead country (to create the EMS discipline of `tying ones hands') against policies generated by extending the domain of policy-making to Europe-wide targets. We find both solutions to be incentive incompatible compared to simple non-cooperative policy-making, unless the aim becomes the social welfare of Europe as a whole. Various modifications are considered, but incentive compatibility requires some monetary relaxation in order to redistribute the gains. That combines German monetary discipline with differentiated fiscal-monetary mixes for the different economic structures elsewhere in the system. These results are used to explain why wider bands paradoxically provide a more credible route to monetary union. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | European monetary union
Policy cooperation
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1204
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530344
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alessandra Casella. DP1204 Free Trade and Evolving Standards. 1995.
|
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