| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1207 |
| DP1207 Why is there Multilateral Lending? | |
| Dani Rodrik | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. We model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity. Public-sector firms are assumed to be social welfare maximizers and compared to private-sector firms, therefore, they bargain lower effort levels since they have the interests of consumers and workers at heart. Our model predicts that under certain conditions privatization should raise effort and so lower X-inefficiency, and that wages may increase or decrease. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining X-inefficiency Privatization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1207 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530345 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dani Rodrik. DP1207 Why is there Multilateral Lending?. 1995. |
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