| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1211 |
| DP1211 Underpricing, Ownership and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK | |
| Julian Franks; Michael J Brennan | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An indivisible good is to be consumed by one of several agents. The consumption involves identity-dependent externalities to the non-consumers. Resale markets for such goods are analysed in various institutional settings with complete information, assuming the agents cannot commit to future actions. It is shown that the laissez-faire institution results in final outcomes that are welfare-equivalent irrespective of the initial structure of property rights. The final outcome need not be socially optimal, however. While the independence result is in the spirit of Coase, the inefficiency result shows that the independence and efficiency properties are logically unrelated. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Coase theorem Externalities Non-commitment Resale |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1211 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530348 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julian Franks,Michael J Brennan. DP1211 Underpricing, Ownership and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK. 1995. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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