| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1212 |
| DP1212 Minimum Wages: Curse or Blessing? | |
| Jan Rose Sorensen; Morten Ravn | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfare are higher in an equilibrium in which government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment yields gains but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Commitment Dynamic consistency Export subsidies R&d subsidies Research and development Strategic trade policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1212 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530349 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jan Rose Sorensen,Morten Ravn. DP1212 Minimum Wages: Curse or Blessing?. 1995. |
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