G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1215
DP1215 Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme
Sweder van Wijnbergen; Anton Marcincin
发表日期1995-09-30
出版年1995
语种英语
摘要Avocates of formal fiscal restraints on the member states of the European Monetary Union often argue that US experience proves that a monetary union needs such constraints to guarantee the stability of the common currency. We show, first, that the origin of formal fiscal restraints on US state governments is unrelated to monetary questions. Second, we show that the same is true for similar constraints in Australia. Third, we show that the incidence of fiscal restraints is strongly correlated with the central government's ownership of the national tax base. The implication for Europe is that fiscal restraints are unnecessary as long as the EU retains a high degree of fiscal decentralization.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Fiscal federalism Fiscal restraints Monetary union
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1215
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530377
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Sweder van Wijnbergen,Anton Marcincin. DP1215 Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme. 1995.
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