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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP1292 |
DP1292 The Geography of Multi-Speed Europe | |
Philippe Martin; Gianmarco Ottaviano | |
发表日期 | 1995-11-30 |
出版年 | 1995 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper examines the free-market and socially-optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other, but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they play strategically against the government. Second-best optimal subsidies to R&D are presumptively higher than first-best ones, but policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | R&d cooperation R&d spillovers Research development Research joint ventures Strategic aspects Subgame perfect equilibrium |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1292 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530425 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Martin,Gianmarco Ottaviano. DP1292 The Geography of Multi-Speed Europe. 1995. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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