| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1288
|
| DP1288 A Voting Power Analysis of Supranational and National Influence in the EU |
| Mika Widgren
|
| 发表日期 | 1996-01-31
|
| 出版年 | 1996
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the strategic decisions of two identical duopolists, who choose production technology as well as product differentiation through their R&D investment. The product market is characterized by heterogeneous Cournot competition. Firms have an incentive to invest in both process innovation and product innovation. The optimal division between these two kinds of R&D activities changes with market size. The higher consumers' willingness to pay, the more firms' investment is driven to product differentiation. If firms coordinate their R&D activities and share R&D costs, but remain rivals in the product market, they will reduce costs and differentiate their products more than under competition. The optimal proportion of R&D investment is driven more to product innovation than under R&D competition. It can be shown that welfare is increased if firms coordinate their research activities and share R&D costs. When firms cooperate, but do not share their R&D costs, welfare is only enhanced if product innovations are not too expensive. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Market size
Process innovation
Product innovation
R&d cooperation
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1288
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530449
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Mika Widgren. DP1288 A Voting Power Analysis of Supranational and National Influence in the EU. 1996.
|
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