| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1327
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| DP1327 Monopolistic Competition, Trade, and Endogenous Spatial Fluctuations |
| Gianmarco Ottaviano
|
| 发表日期 | 1996-02-29
|
| 出版年 | 1996
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper introduces asymmetric information about workers' abilities into the turnover-training model of Phelps (1994) and Salop (1979). This makes hiring an investment under uncertainty. We show that an increase in the level of uncertainty reduces the rate of hiring, increases the optimal wage, and reduces steady-state employment. We conclude that the optimal rate of hiring by firms with hiring pools that have a proportionately high number of young workers is lower, and the rate of employment among these workers lower, since it is more difficult to predict their future performance. Also, the use of statistical discrimination is shown to increase employment because it reduces uncertainty about the ability of new hires. Conversely, anti-discrimination laws and quotas increase the rate of unemployment in this model. |
| 关键词 | Hiring costs
Incentive wages
Quitting
Uncertainty
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1327
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530476
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gianmarco Ottaviano. DP1327 Monopolistic Competition, Trade, and Endogenous Spatial Fluctuations. 1996.
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