| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1346 |
| DP1346 Immigration, Trade, and Austrian Unemployment | |
| Rudolf Winter-Ebmer; Josef Zweimüller | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take not only product market but also take-over decisions. We show that the optimal contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under both quantity and price competition. This result contrasts with the previous literature, and hinges on the fact that with a more aggressive manager rival firms earn lower profits and are willing to sell out at a lower price. As a side-effect of such a contract, however, the manager might take more rivals over than it would be profitable. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incentives Merger profitability Take-overs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1346 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530488 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rudolf Winter-Ebmer,Josef Zweimüller. DP1346 Immigration, Trade, and Austrian Unemployment. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
