| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1357 |
| DP1357 Sustainability of High Public Debt: What the Historical Record Shows | |
| Albrecht Ritschl | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper deals with aspects of national and supranational influence in the European Union. The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, it deals with the relationship between the Council and Commission by applying the standard measures of voting power of cooperative games. It then extends the voting game of 15 countries in the Council of Ministers to a voting game of 16 actors: the Commission plus 15 member states. This is done by taking into account that a Commission proposal is always required for the Council to take a decision. Second, the paper analyses the impact of alternative rules and compares the problems they have with the current rule. Third, the paper investigates how these problems could be avoided. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Cooperative game theory European union Voting power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1357 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530497 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Albrecht Ritschl. DP1357 Sustainability of High Public Debt: What the Historical Record Shows. 1996. |
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