G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1357
DP1357 Sustainability of High Public Debt: What the Historical Record Shows
Albrecht Ritschl
发表日期1996-02-29
出版年1996
语种英语
摘要The paper deals with aspects of national and supranational influence in the European Union. The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, it deals with the relationship between the Council and Commission by applying the standard measures of voting power of cooperative games. It then extends the voting game of 15 countries in the Council of Ministers to a voting game of 16 actors: the Commission plus 15 member states. This is done by taking into account that a Commission proposal is always required for the Council to take a decision. Second, the paper analyses the impact of alternative rules and compares the problems they have with the current rule. Third, the paper investigates how these problems could be avoided.
主题International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词Cooperative game theory European union Voting power
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1357
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530497
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Albrecht Ritschl. DP1357 Sustainability of High Public Debt: What the Historical Record Shows. 1996.
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