| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1361 |
| DP1361 Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation | |
| Melvyn G Coles; Andrew Hildreth | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete on quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of mutual recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis includes entry deterrence by the choice of a particular standard. With identical costs, both industries remain in the market under either regulatory alternative. Mutual recognition is the optimal policy choice for either region. With significantly different costs, the full-harmonization outcome includes only one firm and leads to a maximal sum of regional welfares. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Entry Oligopoly Product differentiation Quality standards Trade |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1361 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530511 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Melvyn G Coles,Andrew Hildreth. DP1361 Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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