| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1384 |
| DP1384 Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry | |
| Stefan Lutz | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper looks at the effect of quitting on the number of workers trained under conditions of uncertainty about future productivity when workers have both firm-specific and industry-specific skills. A new effect is found which works in the opposite direction to the undertraining result of Stevens (1994, 1995): A high quit rate makes investment in training less irreversible in the presence of firing costs and hence also less risky. This effect makes firms start hiring new workers at a lower level of productivity and hire more workers for a given increase in productivity. A rise in the quit rate can now either decrease or increase the number of trained workers. |
| 关键词 | Quitting externalities Uncertainty Under-investment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1384 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530524 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefan Lutz. DP1384 Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry. 1996. |
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