G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1384
DP1384 Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry
Stefan Lutz
发表日期1996-04-30
出版年1996
语种英语
摘要This paper looks at the effect of quitting on the number of workers trained under conditions of uncertainty about future productivity when workers have both firm-specific and industry-specific skills. A new effect is found which works in the opposite direction to the undertraining result of Stevens (1994, 1995): A high quit rate makes investment in training less irreversible in the presence of firing costs and hence also less risky. This effect makes firms start hiring new workers at a lower level of productivity and hire more workers for a given increase in productivity. A rise in the quit rate can now either decrease or increase the number of trained workers.
关键词Quitting externalities Uncertainty Under-investment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1384
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530524
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Stefan Lutz. DP1384 Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry. 1996.
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