G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1415
DP1415 Effective Protection and Investment Incentives in Egypt and Jordan During the Transition to Free Trade with Europe
Simeon Djankov
发表日期1996-06-30
出版年1996
语种英语
摘要Administrative and political reorganization is being actively debated even in the mature, stable economies of Western Europe. This paper investigates the possibility of such reorganization being tied to the integration of economic markets. The paper describes the equilibrium of a game where heterogeneous individuals form coalitions for the provision of a public good, and where the number and composition of these coalitions depend on the overall size of the market. Changes in the extent of the market put pressure on existing jurisdictions because they change both the desired public goods and, more importantly, the trade-offs that determine the borders of the jurisdictions. Thus individuals will want to renegotiate the agreements that support the existing jurisdictions and form alternative coalitions.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Coalition formation Economic integration Market size Strong nash equilibrium
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1415
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530558
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Simeon Djankov. DP1415 Effective Protection and Investment Incentives in Egypt and Jordan During the Transition to Free Trade with Europe. 1996.
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