| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1418 |
| DP1418 Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM | |
| Matthew B Canzoneri; Anthony Yates; Charles Nolan | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we develop a theory of union bargaining power based on firm-specific skills acquired by the insider work-force. We show that unions increase the bargaining power of insiders only in states of the world in which the firm would like to retain insiders but not hire outsiders. Union formation leads to inefficient retention of workers in the firm. Furthermore, new workers are hired at wages below the going market rate. Union power may either increase or decrease the amount of hiring of the firm, however. This paper can thus be understood as developing an insider-outsider theory in which harrassment or discrimination of new workers by the insider work-force is neither individually rational nor needed to explain inefficient hiring decisions or union formation. |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Insider-outsider theory Quits Underemployment Unions Wage determination |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1418 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530561 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew B Canzoneri,Anthony Yates,Charles Nolan. DP1418 Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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