| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1425
|
| DP1425 Regional Growth in Japan |
| Etsuro Shioji
|
| 发表日期 | 1996-06-30
|
| 出版年 | 1996
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper we obtain the time-consistent solution to a stochastic dynamic version of the strategic export subsidy problem. The dynamic structure of the problem emanates either from an exhaustible resource or from a learning-by-doing technology. In any given period, nature ?chooses? the stochastic demand and cost parameters first. Then, governments choose subsidies. Lastly, firms choose output levels. We establish existence, uniqueness, and representation results for the time-consistent equilibrium of the game. Various interesting features of the solution are illustrated by simulation analysis. In particular, subsidies jump immediately to positive levels and, perhaps paradoxically, are reduced gradually to zero in the exhaustible resource case, while they keep rising in the learning-by-doing case. Subsidies are higher in the learning-by-doing case than when the good in question is an exhaustible resource. Also, they are higher in the case when only one government is active, and lower in the corresponding time-inconsistent equilibrium case. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics
|
| 关键词 | Exhaustible resource
Learning-by-doing
Strategic export subsidy
Time-consistent equilibrium
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1425
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530567
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Etsuro Shioji. DP1425 Regional Growth in Japan. 1996.
|
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