| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1472 |
| DP1472 Market Transparency, Competitive Pressure and Price Volatility | |
| Kai-Uwe Kühn; Catalina B Martínez | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-09-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how the existence of a potential entrant influences an incumbent?s choice of quality in a model of vertical product differentiation and entry. Both firms face fixed set-up costs and quality-dependent costs of production, and compete on quality and price. With identical quality-dependent costs, the incumbent will always deter entry if possible, i.e. if fixed costs are high. Quality will be set at a level lower than the optimal quality set if entry was accommodated. If entry is not blockaded, quality will be set at a level strictly lower than the optimal quality set under monopoly. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Entry Oligopoly Product differentiation Quality standards |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1472 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530611 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kai-Uwe Kühn,Catalina B Martínez. DP1472 Market Transparency, Competitive Pressure and Price Volatility. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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