| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1477 |
| DP1477 On the Taxation of Human and Physical Capital in Models of Endogenous Growth | |
| Nouriel Roubini | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The crucial ingredient in our model is that the current employer has superior information about the worker?s ability relative to other firms. This informational advantage gives the employer an ex-post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the firm to provide training. We show that the model can lead to multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training high. We also derive predictions from our model not shared by other explanations of firm-sponsored training. Using microdata from Germany, we show that the predictions of the specific human capital model are rejected, while our model receives support from the data. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information General human capital German apprenticeship system Monopsony Training |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1477 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530626 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nouriel Roubini. DP1477 On the Taxation of Human and Physical Capital in Models of Endogenous Growth. 1996. |
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