| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1506 |
| DP1506 Trust and Search in Vietnam's Emerging Private Sector | |
| Stephan Haggard; John McMillan; Christopher Woodruff | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an economy where property rights are necessary to ensure sufficient rewards to ex-ante investments. Because enforcement of property rights influences the ex-post distribution of rents, there is room for corruption. We characterize the optimal organization of society and the optimal degree of property rights enforcement subject to incentive constraints of the agents. We find that three frequently mentioned government failures arise quite naturally as part of the optimal mechanism: i) rents to government employees; ii) corruption; and iii) misallocation of talent. Therefore, these observations are not by themselves proof of government failure. We also discover that the general equilibrium aspect of our model leads to a number of new results: there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible to simultaneously reduce corruption and the misallocation of talent, and increase investment. It will also often be the case that bureaucracies will impose a certain amount of self discipline. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Allocation of talent Corruption Development Law enforcement Property rights |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1506 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530646 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephan Haggard,John McMillan,Christopher Woodruff. DP1506 Trust and Search in Vietnam's Emerging Private Sector. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
