| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1519 |
| DP1519 Institutions and Labour Reallocation | |
| Richard Rogerson; Giuseppe Bertola | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a ?toehold? bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a toehold on a bidder?s strategy may be small, the indirect effect is large in a common value auction. When a firm bids more aggressively, its competitors face an increased winner?s curse and must bid more conservatively. This allows the toeholder to bid more aggressively still, and so on. One implication is that a controlling minority shareholder may be immune to outside offers. The board of a target may increase the expected sale price by allowing a second bidder to buy a toehold on favourable terms, or by running a sealed bid auction. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Common value auctions Corporate acquisitions Footholds Mergers Takeovers Toeholds Winner's curse |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1519 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530658 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard Rogerson,Giuseppe Bertola. DP1519 Institutions and Labour Reallocation. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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