| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1522 |
| DP1522 Minimum Quality Standards as Facilitating Devices: An Example with Leapfrogging and Exit | |
| Stefan Lutz | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Plaintiffs have either strong or weak cases. Both cases should be taken to court, yet weak cases need more work by the attorney than strong cases. Only the attorney knows whether a case needs additional work or not; the plaintiff is forced to rely on the attorney?s recommendation. We show that under contingent fees there will generally be excessive litigation. In contrast, an hourly fee implements the efficient amount of litigation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contingent fees Expert services Incentives Litigation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1522 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530659 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefan Lutz. DP1522 Minimum Quality Standards as Facilitating Devices: An Example with Leapfrogging and Exit. 1996. |
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