| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1505 |
| DP1505 Four Essays and a Funeral: Budgetary Arithmetic under the Maastricht Treaty | |
| Andrew Hughes Hallett; Peter McAdam | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The merger literature almost exclusively considers mergers between exogenously specified firms. This paper proposes an approach to predict the pattern of mergers in situations where different mergers are feasible. It generalizes the traditional industrial organization approach, employing ideas on coalition-formation from cooperative game theory. The model suggests that in concentrated markets, equilibrium mergers are conducive to market structures with large industry profits, thus pointing to an inherent conflict between private and socially-correct merger incentives. While applying the model, light is also thrown on formation of research joint ventures, mergers between quantity-constrained firms, and tariff-jumping foreign direct investment. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1505 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530667 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Hughes Hallett,Peter McAdam. DP1505 Four Essays and a Funeral: Budgetary Arithmetic under the Maastricht Treaty. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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