| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1521 |
| DP1521 Benefit Duration and Unemployment Entry: Quasi-experimental Evidence for Austria | |
| Rudolf Winter-Ebmer | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive sectors (modern and traditional) is presented. Political participation is viewed as a costly activity. We show what drives entry into politics and how the size of the elite affects the level of distortions. The model also highlights the role played by the initial distribution of wealth in determining the long-run pattern of political participation and economic performance. We show why one society may converge to an equilibrium with low distortions and social equality, while others may end up with an institutional framework that brings about high distortions and social polarization. The model is then extended to account for the provision of public goods, to analyse the effects of rent-seeking on technological change, and to allow for random shocks in intergenerational transfers. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Development Distribution Elites Growth Political economy Rent-seeking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1521 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530670 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rudolf Winter-Ebmer. DP1521 Benefit Duration and Unemployment Entry: Quasi-experimental Evidence for Austria. 1996. |
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