| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1539 |
| DP1539 Competition between Intermediated and Direct Trade and the Timing of Disintermediation | |
| John Fingleton | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Price-level targeting (without base drift) and inflation targeting (with base drift) are compared under commitment and discretion, with persistence in unemployment. Price-level targeting is often said to imply more short-run inflation variability and thereby more employment variability than inflation targeting. Counter to this conventional wisdom, under discretion a price-level target results in lower inflation variability than an inflation target (if unemployment is at least moderately persistent). A price-level target also eliminates the inflation bias under discretion and, as is well known, reduces long-term price variability. Society may be better off assigning a price-level target to the central bank even if its preferences correspond to inflation targeting. A price-level target thus appears to have more advantages than commonly acknowledged. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Inflation targets Price stability |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1539 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530677 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Fingleton. DP1539 Competition between Intermediated and Direct Trade and the Timing of Disintermediation. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [John Fingleton]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [John Fingleton]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [John Fingleton]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
