| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1542 |
| DP1542 The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation | |
| Klaus Schmidt | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized. Noise traders are small investors trading through mutual funds to hedge non-tradable or illiquid assets. The insider with trade-information is one of the fund managers. We find that front-running activity reduces their customers? liquidity costs, but it also reduces their hedging benefits. As a result, the customers of the front-running manager may be worse off and place smaller orders. The opposite is true, for those investors who are not subject to front-running, however. In aggregate, front-running will either have no effect, or have a positive effect on welfare. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Front-running Insider trading Noise trading |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1542 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530685 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus Schmidt. DP1542 The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Klaus Schmidt]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Klaus Schmidt]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Klaus Schmidt]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
