| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1541 |
| DP1541 Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways | |
| Klaus Schmidt; Monika Schnitzer | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the impact of a selective extension of unemployment benefit duration on the incidence of unemployment in Austria. As the new law applies only to elderly workers in certain regions of the country after June 1988, a quasi-experimental situation is created. Unemployment entry is found to rise by between four and eleven percentage points due to the new law. The findings are explained by a breach of an implicit contract; elderly workers receive wages above their marginal product in order to elicit higher effort. Dismissal of elderly workers is now easier because more generous unemployment insurance makes reputation loss for the firm less severe. |
| 关键词 | Elderly workers Implicit contracts Unemployment entry Unemployment insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1541 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530688 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus Schmidt,Monika Schnitzer. DP1541 Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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