G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1541
DP1541 Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways
Klaus Schmidt; Monika Schnitzer
发表日期1997-01-31
出版年1997
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the impact of a selective extension of unemployment benefit duration on the incidence of unemployment in Austria. As the new law applies only to elderly workers in certain regions of the country after June 1988, a quasi-experimental situation is created. Unemployment entry is found to rise by between four and eleven percentage points due to the new law. The findings are explained by a breach of an implicit contract; elderly workers receive wages above their marginal product in order to elicit higher effort. Dismissal of elderly workers is now easier because more generous unemployment insurance makes reputation loss for the firm less severe.
关键词Elderly workers Implicit contracts Unemployment entry Unemployment insurance
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1541
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530688
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Klaus Schmidt,Monika Schnitzer. DP1541 Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways. 1997.
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