G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1549
DP1549 Strategic Trade Policy When Firms Have Different Efficiency Levels
Dermot Leahy; Catia Montagna
发表日期1997-01-31
出版年1997
语种英语
摘要The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work ? the move from occupational specialization towards multi-tasking ? for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms? profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using wages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.
关键词Centralized wage bargaining Employment Information flows Organization of firms Restructuring Technological change Unemployment Wage formation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1549
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530692
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dermot Leahy,Catia Montagna. DP1549 Strategic Trade Policy When Firms Have Different Efficiency Levels. 1997.
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