| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1550 |
| DP1550 On the Strategic Community Development | |
| Jacques-François Thisse; Vernon Henderson | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N+K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm?s exit time is independent both of K and of the actions of other players. Second, in the limit in which firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural-oligopoly problem), the field is immediately reduced to N+1 firms. Furthermore, we have perfect sorting, so it is always the K?1 lowest-value players who drop out in zero time, even though each player?s value is private information to the player. We apply our model to politics, explaining the length of time it takes to collect a winning coalition to pass a bill. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | 'strategic independence' 'twoness' Auctions Natural monopoly Oligopoly Political decision making Standards War of attrition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1550 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530693 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jacques-François Thisse,Vernon Henderson. DP1550 On the Strategic Community Development. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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