| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1555 |
| DP1555 Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union | |
| Jurgen von Hagen; Mark Hallerberg | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper surveys recent results of auction theory, bargaining theory and political economy in order to compare different methods of privatization. We assume that a government is not only interested in maximizing revenues from privatization, but also in achieving an efficient allocation of ownership rights. We show that these two goals may conflict with each other. We argue that in a wide variety of circumstances the government should use an ascending open bid format, however, such as the traditional English auction. In particular, if there are more than two serious bidders, an English auction is more efficient and yields higher revenues than bargaining with a preselected buyer. Finally, if the government has to mass privatize, we show that giving away some fraction of all shares to the general population may be more efficient and yield higher revenues than a policy of selling all firms to the highest bidder. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Eastern europe Expropriation Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1555 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530698 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jurgen von Hagen,Mark Hallerberg. DP1555 Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
