G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1574
DP1574 Lobbying and the Structure of Protection
Jaime de Melo; Olivier Cadot; Marcelo Olarreaga
发表日期1997-02-21
出版年1997
语种英语
摘要This paper analyses the determinants of the inventory to assets ratio in panel data sets of Japanese and UK firms in the period 1960?85. The analytical framework sets inventory decisions in the context of decisions by the firm about other assets and liabilities, in contrast to traditional models of inventories. Investment in inventories in Japan is found to be particularly related to sector-specific inflation rates and expected sales, negatively related to expected profits, and not much affected by interest rates. By contrast, UK inventories are generally positively related to profit rates, and respond to short-term interest rates. Once other variables are taken into account, the coefficient on a time trend is positive for Japan (negative for the United Kingdom), which casts some doubt on the widely held view of Japanese innovation in inventory holding.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Inventories Japanese firms Panel data Uk firms
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1574
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530716
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jaime de Melo,Olivier Cadot,Marcelo Olarreaga. DP1574 Lobbying and the Structure of Protection. 1997.
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