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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP1574 |
DP1574 Lobbying and the Structure of Protection | |
Jaime de Melo; Olivier Cadot; Marcelo Olarreaga | |
发表日期 | 1997-02-21 |
出版年 | 1997 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper analyses the determinants of the inventory to assets ratio in panel data sets of Japanese and UK firms in the period 1960?85. The analytical framework sets inventory decisions in the context of decisions by the firm about other assets and liabilities, in contrast to traditional models of inventories. Investment in inventories in Japan is found to be particularly related to sector-specific inflation rates and expected sales, negatively related to expected profits, and not much affected by interest rates. By contrast, UK inventories are generally positively related to profit rates, and respond to short-term interest rates. Once other variables are taken into account, the coefficient on a time trend is positive for Japan (negative for the United Kingdom), which casts some doubt on the widely held view of Japanese innovation in inventory holding. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Inventories Japanese firms Panel data Uk firms |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1574 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530716 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaime de Melo,Olivier Cadot,Marcelo Olarreaga. DP1574 Lobbying and the Structure of Protection. 1997. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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