| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1591 |
| DP1591 Family Matters | |
| John F Ermisch; Marco Francesconi | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When regional governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will always offer to subsidize the firm. Furthermore, the maximum subsidy is greater in the larger region. If countries are given an additional instrument (either a tariff or a consumption tax), however, then the larger country will no longer underbid its smaller rival and its best offer may involve a positive profit tax. In both cases the equilibirum outcome is that the firm locates in the larger market, paying a profit tax that is increasing in the relative size of this market and which is made greater when the tariff (consumption tax) instrument is permitted. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Economic integration Foreign direct investment Regional location Tax competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1591 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530725 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John F Ermisch,Marco Francesconi. DP1591 Family Matters. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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