| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1625 |
| DP1625 Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device | |
| Rudolf Kerschbamer; Yanni Tournas | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a theoretical model in which firms may choose multiple banking relationships to reduce the risk that financing will be denied by ?relationship banks? should the latter experience liquidity problems and refuse to roll over lines of credit. The inability to refinance from relationship banks signals unfavourable information about the quality of the firm?s project, which may also prevent the firm from obtaining credit from other banks. We show that if this ?lemons? problem is severe, it is optimal to establish a relationship with more than one bank in spite of higher transaction costs; if it is mild, a single banking relationship is optimal. We find that the severity of the lemons problem depends directly on the inefficiency of bankruptcy procedures and inversely on the ?fragility? of the banking system. The paper concludes with a comparison of bank-firm relationships in Italy and the United States, characterized respectively by multiple and single banking. We present evidence that bankruptcy costs are significantly higher and banks less fragile in Italy than in the United States, suggesting that the factors identified by the theoretical model are relevant in practice. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate finance Multiple banking Relationship banking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1625 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530776 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rudolf Kerschbamer,Yanni Tournas. DP1625 Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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