| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1636 |
| DP1636 Transition and the Output Fall | |
| Gerard Roland; Thierry Verdier | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A quality improvement often necessitates modifications of varietal product features. This paper studies firms? incentives to provide quality when this decision affects the goods? degree of horizontal differentiation. Intuitively, one is inclined to argue that private incentives to provide quality are insufficient relative to the social optimum if a quality improvement reduces horizontal differentiation. We find that this argument depends on whether the game is simultaneous or sequential. In the former case private incentives prove excessive relative to the social optimum, and in the latter case, insufficient. As a result, a regulator might want to impose either minimum or maximum quality standards. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competitive positioning Multi-dimensional product differentiation Quality standards |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1636 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530779 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Roland,Thierry Verdier. DP1636 Transition and the Output Fall. 1997. |
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