| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1648 |
| DP1648 Bid-Ask Spreads with Indirect Competition among Specialists | |
| Thomas Gehrig; Matthew O. Jackson | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It has been argued in the literature that interjurisdictional competition forces the public sector to increase its efficiency and thus helps to tame Leviathan governments. The paper addresses this hypothesis by means of a simple tax-competition model with a Leviathan state. It is seen that the effects of increased factor mobility on the efficiency of the public sector are ambiguous. A calibration of the model shows that a reduction in public-sector efficiency is possible for parameter constellations which are not unrealistic. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Capital movements Infrastructure Public choice Tax competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1648 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530788 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Gehrig,Matthew O. Jackson. DP1648 Bid-Ask Spreads with Indirect Competition among Specialists. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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