| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1668 |
| DP1668 A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources and Economic Growth | |
| Thorvaldur Gylfason; Gylfi Zoega; Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-07-30 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the impact of market structure on the probability of banking failure when banks? loan portfolios are subject to aggregate uncertainty. In our model borrowers are subject to a moral hazard problem, which induces banks to choose between two second-best alternative devices: costly monitoring and credit rationing. We show that investment depends on both the lending rate and the information structure. Since monitoring incentives increase with interest rate margins, the relationship between market structure and investment is ambiguous. Also, larger investment levels imply that the expected return of marginal projects is lower and thus banks? portfolios are more vulnerable to aggregate uncertainty. Consequently, a monopoly bank monitors borrowers more intensively, rations the amount of credit less frequently and hence may go bankrupt with higher probability than competitive banks. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Banking competition Bankruptcy Credit constraint Monitoring Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1668 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530810 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thorvaldur Gylfason,Gylfi Zoega,Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson. DP1668 A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources and Economic Growth. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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