| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1671 |
| DP1671 R&D Spillovers and the Case for Industrial Policy in an Open Economy | |
| Peter Neary; Dermot Leahy | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-07-30 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Commercial bank debts of developing countries are held by a heterogenous group of banks. Here we focus on the distinction between large international money-centre banks and smaller domestic banks. In particular we investigate the role of debt concentration ? the amount of a country?s debt held by large banks relative to small banks ? on the secondary market price for these loans. Our empirical investigation indicates that concentration is an important determinant of secondary market discounts: higher concentration decreases the discount. An explanation for this finding is provided in the context of a bargaining model that endogenizes the level of the maximum penalty that banks can credibly threaten to impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks? bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, which in turn increases repayment and secondary market prices (and hence lowers discounts). |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Bargaining power Secondary market prices Sovereign debt |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1671 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530813 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Neary,Dermot Leahy. DP1671 R&D Spillovers and the Case for Industrial Policy in an Open Economy. 1997. |
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