| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1681 |
| DP1681 Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countries | |
| Guido Tabellini; Francesco Daveri | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In an economy where entrepreneurs with unequal ?abilities? face alternative investment projects, which differ in their degree of risk and productivity, we analyse the Nash equilibrium contracts arising from a banks-borrowers game in the context of asymmetric information. We show that, for a particular characterization of the game, one can determine the endogenous distribution of projects and the ?type? of contracts (pooling or separating) as functions of the amount of loanable funds. We then apply this game to a general equilibrium aggregative economy with production, populated by overlapping generations of borrowers and lenders. We show that, for a range of parameter values, equilibria are characterized by persistent endogenous cycles. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Business cycle Financial intermediation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1681 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530824 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Tabellini,Francesco Daveri. DP1681 Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countries. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
