| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1688 |
| DP1688 The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank | |
| Michael Artis; Bernhard Winkler | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the proposed ?stability pact? for countries joining a European Monetary Union (EMU). Within EMU shortsighted governments fail to fully internalize the inflationary consequences of their debt policies, which results in excessive debt accumulation. Hence, although in the absence of EMU governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact, within EMU they prefer a stability pact which punishes excessive debt accumulation. With idiosyncratic shocks to governments? budgets, EMU combined with an appropriately designed stability pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy. While the stability pact corrects the average debt bias, inflation, which is attuned to the Union-average debt level, is more stable. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Debt policy European monetary union inflation monetary policy Political distortions Stability pact |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1688 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530831 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Artis,Bernhard Winkler. DP1688 The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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