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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP1708 |
DP1708 The Labour Market and Corporate Structure | |
Daron Acemoğlu; Andrew Newman | |
发表日期 | 1997-10-31 |
出版年 | 1997 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We use a classroom game, the ?Wallet Game?, to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or a small ownership of the object by one bidder; the effects of these asymmetries are greatly exacerbated by entry costs or bidding costs. We discuss applications to airwaves auctions and takeover battles including the Glaxo-Wellcome merger. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Airwaves auction Auction theory Common values Corporate acquisitions Mergers Pcs auction Spectrum auction Takeovers Winner's curse |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1708 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530851 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoğlu,Andrew Newman. DP1708 The Labour Market and Corporate Structure. 1997. |
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