| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1737 |
| DP1737 Comparative Politics and Public Finance | |
| Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini; Gerard Roland | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Comparative politics Electoral accountability Legislative cohesion Political economics Public finance Separation of powers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1737 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530880 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini,Gerard Roland. DP1737 Comparative Politics and Public Finance. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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