| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1745 |
| DP1745 Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies | |
| Dan Ben-David | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a welfare comparison of the two procedures by constructing a game-theoretic model of decision making by an arbitrator in the face of self-interested reporting strategies by the interested parties. Even if it is assumed that the arbitrator is, on average, as well informed as the two opposing parties, the adversarial procedure is strictly superior. The source of this superiority lies in a non-convexity in the adversarial procedure. There are increasing marginal returns to improvements in the information of an interested party. There are no analogous increasing returns to the arbitrator?s information under the inquisitorial procedure. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Advocates Asymmetric information Inquisitor Legal procedure Persuasion games Value of information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1745 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530887 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dan Ben-David. DP1745 Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies. 1997. |
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