G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1745
DP1745 Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies
Dan Ben-David
发表日期1997-11-30
出版年1997
语种英语
摘要Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a welfare comparison of the two procedures by constructing a game-theoretic model of decision making by an arbitrator in the face of self-interested reporting strategies by the interested parties. Even if it is assumed that the arbitrator is, on average, as well informed as the two opposing parties, the adversarial procedure is strictly superior. The source of this superiority lies in a non-convexity in the adversarial procedure. There are increasing marginal returns to improvements in the information of an interested party. There are no analogous increasing returns to the arbitrator?s information under the inquisitorial procedure.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Advocates Asymmetric information Inquisitor Legal procedure Persuasion games Value of information
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1745
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530887
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dan Ben-David. DP1745 Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies. 1997.
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