| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1764 |
| DP1764 Approval Rules for Sequential Horizontal Mergers | |
| Pedro Barros | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-12-19 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Producing high technology output and supplying sophisticated services often involves costly investment in industry-specific skills. But the threat of poaching means that it is the individual ?stakeholder?, not the firm, who must bear the cost. We investigate various mechanisms for funding human capital investment in an industry equilibrium framework where capital market imperfections would (in the absence of intervention) result in underinvestment. The main result is that government provision of loan guarantees (conditional on no-bankruptcy) leads to wage hikes which (by forcing exit of some firms thus increasing monopoly power) raise profits in a socially inefficient manner: income contingent loans and levy subsidy schemes, meanwhile, can result in a socially efficient outcome. |
| 关键词 | Credit constraint Industry equilibrium Industry-specific skill Irreversible investment Stakeholder |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1764 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530907 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pedro Barros. DP1764 Approval Rules for Sequential Horizontal Mergers. 1997. |
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