| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1766 |
| DP1766 Fiscal Norming of Wages to Promote Employment with Monopoly Unions | |
| Alain De Crombrugghe; Gregory de Walque | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-12-19 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Venture capital financing is characterized by extensive use of convertible debt and stage financing. The paper shows why convertible debt is better than a simple mixture of debt and equity in stage financing situations. When the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project, the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in ?window dressing? or short-termism, i.e. to bias positively the short-term performance of the project, in order to reduce the probability that the project will be liquidated. With a convertible debt contract, such behaviour reduces the likelihood of liquidation, but increases the probability that the venture capitalist will convert debt into equity, reducing the entrepreneur?s profits. With convertible debt, therefore, the entrepreneur will not engage in as much short-term behaviour in terms of signal manipulation in comparison to a situation where only straight debt-equity financing is used. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Convertible debt Short termism Venture capital Window dressing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1766 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530909 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alain De Crombrugghe,Gregory de Walque. DP1766 Fiscal Norming of Wages to Promote Employment with Monopoly Unions. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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