| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1770
|
| DP1770 Competition and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from Firm Level Surveys in Slovenia, Hungary and Romania |
| Jozef Konings
|
| 发表日期 | 1997-12-19
|
| 出版年 | 1997
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | Comparative politics
Electoral accountability
Legislative cohesion
Political economics
Public finance
Separation of powers
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1770
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530912
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jozef Konings. DP1770 Competition and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from Firm Level Surveys in Slovenia, Hungary and Romania. 1997.
|
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