| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1776
|
| DP1776 Democracies Pay Higher Wages |
| Dani Rodrik
|
| 发表日期 | 1998-01-31
|
| 出版年 | 1998
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Investors are keenly interested in financial reports of earnings because earnings provide important information for investment decisions. Thus, executives who are monitored by investors and directors face strong incentives to manage earnings. We introduce consideration of behavioural/institutional thresholds for earnings in this mix of incentives and governance. A model illustrates how thresholds induce specific types of earnings management. Empirical explorations find clear support for earnings management to exceed each of the three thresholds that we consider: positive profits, sustain-recent-performance, and meet-market-expectations. The thresholds are hierarchically ranked. The future performance of firms that possibly boost earnings to just cross a threshold appears to be poorer than that of less suspect control groups. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Behavioural finance
Earnings management
Thresholds
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1776
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530920
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dani Rodrik. DP1776 Democracies Pay Higher Wages. 1998.
|
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