G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1780
DP1780 Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation and Bank Bailouts
Janet Mitchell
发表日期1998-01-31
出版年1998
语种英语
摘要Merger approval decisions lie at the heart of competition policies. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) presented a model stating safe harbour rules for merger approval. In the presence of sequential mergers, however, computation of the sufficient external effect criterion for each merger may not be possible as the second merger will be influenced by the equilibrium emerging from the first. If the mergers are close enough in time, the second merger must be evaluated without the knowledge of the equilibrium point after the first merger. Two alternatives are proposed: joint merger evaluation and independent merger evaluation. The decision errors (too many approvals or rejections) are identified for each of the alternative rules. It is shown that joint merger evaluations generate too many rejections of mergers and independent evaluations lead to too many approvals.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Antitrust policy Approval rules Mergers
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1780
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530924
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Janet Mitchell. DP1780 Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation and Bank Bailouts. 1998.
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