| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1785 |
| DP1785 Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks | |
| Adrian van Rixtel; Wolter Hassink | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses two aspects of banking crises: the choices that banks make to passively roll over loans in default versus actively pursuing their claims; and choices by regulators to ?punish? passive and insolvent banks versus rescuing them. Banks may choose to roll over loans in order to hide their poor financial conditions or to gamble for resurrection. Regulators can reduce creditor passivity through their ex-ante choice of monitoring capability and their ex-post choice of policy for distressed banks. Yet, if too many banks are discovered to be passive or insolvent, a situation labelled ?too-many-to-fail? (TMTF) may arise, whereby it is less costly to rescue than to close large numbers of banks. Banks may implicitly collude through their choice of actions in order to trigger TMTF. A principal result of the analysis is that when the regulator reacts to the threat of banks triggering TMTF, it is by ?softening?. One form of softening involves lowering the ex-ante monitoring capacity and ?punishing? a smaller number of banks ex post. More undetected passivity will thus exist in equilibrium than if TMTF could not be triggered. |
| 关键词 | Banking Bankruptcy Prudential regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1785 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530928 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adrian van Rixtel,Wolter Hassink. DP1785 Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
