| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1800 |
| DP1800 Monetary Union: The Ins and Outs of Strategic Delegation | |
| Paul Levine; Joseph Pearlman | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-03-09 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper addresses the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in a closed trading bloc consisting of ?ins? forming a monetary union and ?outs? who retain monetary sovereignty. All governments can opt for a particular choice of institutional arrangement for their central bank (CB), however, and delegate monetary policy to it with varying degrees of independence or, equivalently, ?conservatism?. This paper examines the outcome when these decisions are individually rational for governments and are taken strategically, taking in to account the intra-country interactions between fiscal authorities and their own central bank, and the inter-country interactions between the same players. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Central bank independence Delegation game Monetary union |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1800 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530943 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul Levine,Joseph Pearlman. DP1800 Monetary Union: The Ins and Outs of Strategic Delegation. 1998. |
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